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The	 first	 chapter	 describes	 the	 English	 upper	 middle-class	 upbringing	 of	 Pigou.	 The	
serious	 boy	 attended	 Harrow,	 a	 prestigious	 Public-school	 North	 of	 London,	 before	
entering	 King’s	 College	 Cambridge	 in	 1896.	 King’s	 would	 become	 his	 home	 for	 more	
than	five	decades.	He	read	history	and	political	economy,	graduating	with	a	starred	First	
in	 Part	 II	 of	 the	 Moral	 Science	 Tripos	 in	 1900.	 With	 Marshall’s	 support,	 Pigou	 was	
elected	a	fellow	of	King’s	at	the	age	of	25.	
	







the	 same	 time	as	 taking	 some	distance	 from	 the	utilitarian	approach.	Upon	 surveying	
different	positions,	Pigou	considered	that	“the	goodness	of	any	conscious	state	is,	to	use	





The	 third	 chapter	 outlines	 Pigou’s	 welfare	 economics.	 Kumekawa	 focuses	 on	 two	
elements	 of	 Pigou’s	 welfare	 economics	 which	 have	 had	 a	 strong	 posterity:	 external	
economies	 and	 solutions	 to	 the	 problems	 of	 poverty.	 It	 must	 be	 noted	 that	 these	
subjects	 take	only	a	part	of	Pigou’s	 voluminous	Economics	of	Welfare,	 but	Kumekawa	
does	not	explain	why	these	elements	of	Pigou’s	theory	came	to	be	more	important	than	
others	 (more	 on	 this	 below).	 Pigou	 provided	 a	 framework	 for	 thinking	 in	 terms	 of	 a	
tradeoff	between	efficiency	and	equity	(even	if	the	expression	is	not	his),	for	balancing	
the	role	of	incentives	in	securing	an	efficient	allocation	of	resources	and	the	role	of	the	
state	 in	 redistributing	 them	 (p.	 73).	 For	 the	 sake	 of	 scientificity,	 Pigou	 narrowed	 his	
focus	on	economic	welfare	expressed	in	monetary	terms,	yet	he	was	also	interested	in	a	
broader	 conception	 of	 human	 welfare.	 Following	 the	 utilitarian	 tradition	 of	 Mill,	




arose	at	 the	London	School	of	Economics	 in	 the	1930s.	Even	 if	Pigou	was	always	very	
critical	 of	 the	 politicians’	 ability	 to	 enact	 policies	 that	 would	 maximise	 societal	 well-
being—as	 Kumekawa	 highlights	 in	 Pigou’s	 private	 correspondence—he	 held	 on	 to	 an	







Pigou	served	on	many	committees,	 such	as	 the	Royal	Commission	on	the	 Income	Tax,	
but	he	was	never	as	involved	in	the	London	affairs	as	Keynes,	preferring	to	spend	time	
at	 his	 country-side	 house	 in	 the	 Lake	 District,	 or	 mountaineering	 in	 the	 Alps.	 These	





disagreements	 between	 Cambridge	 economists	 had	 always	 existed,	 and	 fissures	 had	
been	 growing	 since	 Marshall’s	 retirement,	 but	 Pigou	 was	 careful	 not	 to	 show	 these	
disagreements	 to	 the	 external	 world.	 The	 scientificity	 of	 economics	 hinged	 on	 the	
appearance	of	consensus	 in	front	of	the	public.	 In	the	1930s,	Pigou	was	challenged	on	
two	 theoretical	 fronts:	 by	 Keynes	 on	 unemployment	 and	 by	 Robbins	 and	 his	 LSE	
colleagues	on	welfare.	Although	we	remember	of	Pigou’s	position	as	the	Classics	straw	
man	 that	 Keynes	made	of	 him,	 his	Theory	 of	Unemployment	 (1933)	was	 actually	well	
received	by	his	peers.	Roy	Harrod	considered	it	«	a	supreme	intellectual	achievement,	a	
masterpiece	 of	 close	 and	 coherent	 reasoning	»	 (p.	 143).	 Pigou	 built	 sophisticated	
models	 of	 the	 economy	 which	 relied	 much	 more	 on	 mathematics	 than	 Marshallian	
economics.	 Pigou	 did	 make	 room	 for	 government	 expenditures	 in	 public	 works	 in	
extraordinary	circumstances,	but	he	argued	the	depression	would	mostly	resolve	 itself	
by	a	reduction	in	wages.	 In	spite	of	Keynes’s	charge	on	Pigou,	 it	must	be	remembered	
that	both	men	were	moderate	 liberals	 along	a	political	 spectrum	 that	 included	at	 the	
time	 far	more	 radical	 positions	on	 the	 left	 and	on	 the	 right,	 even	among	economists.	
The	second	wave	of	challenges	to	Pigou	came	from	young	economists	at	LSE.	With	his	
new	 definition	 of	 the	 scope	 and	 methods	 of	 economics,	 Robbins	 attacked	 Pigou’s	
reliance	on	 interpersonal	comparisons	of	welfare.	Following	Robbins’s	view	of	science,	
Hicks,	 Lange,	 Lerner,	 Kaldor	 and	others	 then	proposed	 a	 new	welfare	 economics	 that	
could	 formulate	policy	 recommendations	without	 relying	on	problematic	 comparisons	
of	utility.	It	is	a	bitter	irony	that	Pigou	devoted	so	much	energy	in	making	economics	a	
scientific	 discipline,	 yet	 by	 the	 1930s	 many	 of	 his	 contributions	 were	 attacked	 as	









elitist	 disdain	 for	 the	 common	man	 and	 turned	his	writing	 to	 the	 general	 public.	 This	
gradual	transformation	was	fuelled	by	a	regained	optimism	in	the	government’s	ability	
to	improve	 the	 welfare	 of	 the	 British	 people.	 The	 central	 role	 played	 in	 the	 postwar	
Labour	party	by	Pigou’s	friend	and	former	student	Philip	Noel-Baker	certainly	played	a	
role	 in	 the	 enthusiasm	 of	 the	 older	 Pigou	 for	 Labour	 policies.	For	 instance,	 he	 was	
supportive	 of	 the	 Beveridge	 Report	 to	 confront	 the	 five	 giant	 evils	 of	Want,	 Disease,	





Both	 in	 his	 introduction	 and	 in	 the	 epilogue,	 Kumekawa	 justifies	 the	 topicality	 of	 his	
book	 by	 recent	 invocations	 of	 Pigou	 by	 American	 economists	 across	 the	 political	
spectrum,	especially	 in	the	context	of	climate	change	and	the	financial	crisis.	How	is	 it	
that	 Pigou	 was	 on	 everyone's	 lips	 in	 the	 recent	 years,	 knowing	 that	 his	 theoretical	
contributions	were	overshadowed	in	the	1930s	by	Keynes	and	his	Cambridge	Circus	on	
one	side,	and	the	LSE	economists	 in	 the	other?	Kumekawa	 is	 right	 to	pinpoint	welfare	
economics	as	Pigou’s	lasting	contribution	(p.	201).	Yet,	he	does	not	suggest	in	any	way	
how	some	of	Pigou’s	ideas	have	survived	through	the	decades,	especially	after	the	new	
welfare	watershed.	Perhaps	 it	 is	beyond	 the	 scope	of	a	biography	of	Pigou	 to	answer	





Public	 economics	 only	 emerged	 in	 the	 1970s	 by	 combining	 methodologically	




older	 American	 institutionalist	 texts	 (Johnson	 2014).	 In	 welfare	 economics,	 Abram	
Bergson	and	Samuelson	took	at	heart	Pigou’s	ethical	motivation.	Their	 reaction	to	the	
new	 welfare	 economics	 acknowledged	 the	 difficulty	 of	 making	 interpersonal	
comparisons	 of	 utility,	 but	 they	 argued	 that	 meaningful	 welfare	 judgement	 could	 be	
made	 if	 they	were	 formulated	objectively	 in	a	 social	welfare	 function.	 In	other	words,	
contrary	 to	 Robbins	 and	 his	 followers,	 for	 Samuelson,	 the	 implications	 of	 ethical	
judgements	 could	 be	 analysed	 scientifically	 by	 economists	 (Backhouse	 2017,	 p.	 470).	
And	indeed,	a	significant	part	of	contemporary	normative	public	economics	formulates	
and	analyses	policy	problems	in	terms	of	social	welfare	functions.	This	literature	has	also	






called	 “Pigovian	 taxes”	 are	 instruments	 to	 correct	 inefficient	market	 outcomes	 in	 the	
presence	of	externalities.	Although	Pigou	devoted	only	a	few	pages	of	his	Economics	of	
Welfare	 to	 what	 are	 now	 called	 environmental	 externalities,	 his	 discussion	 is	 a	
cornerstone	 of	 what	 will	 become	 the	 ‘market	 failure’	 approach	 to	 government	
intervention	 in	 the	middle	of	 the	 twentieth	 century	 (see	Marciano	et	Medema	2015).	
One	 major	 contribution	 to	 this	 literature	 was	 made	 by	 Richard	 Musgrave	 who	 had	
studied	 at	 Harvard	 in	 the	 1930s	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 Bergson	 and	 Samuelson.	 In	 his	
Theory	 of	 Public	 Finance	published	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 1950s,	 Musgrave	 synthesised	
various	 national	 traditions	 in	 public	 finance	 in	 a	 general	 welfare	 framework	
incorporating	public	revenues	and	expenditures.	Musgrave	introduced	his	discussion	of	
social	 goods	 (public	 goods)	 with	 the	 Pigovian	 language	 of	 “discrepancies”	 between	
“social	 costs”	 and	 “private	 costs”.	Musgrave	 is	 an	 intermediate	 figure	between	Pigou,	
and	 the	 leaders	 of	 post-1970s	 public	 economics	 such	 as	 Anthony	 Atkinson,	 James	
Mirrlees	 and	 Joseph	 Stiglitz.	 It	 is	 an	 open	 research	 question	 to	 which	 extent	 these	
economists	were	directly	influenced	by	Pigou,	or	if	they	mainly	learned	about	his	ideas	
through	 the	 filter	of	 Samuelson	and	Musgrave,	 for	 instance.	 This	being	 said,	Medema	
(2017)	has	recently	shown	that	there	was	no	steady	discussion	of	Pigovian	externalities	
between	The	Economics	of	Welfare	 and	 its	witty	 criticism	by	Coase	 (1960).	Even	after	
Coase’s	groundbreaking	paper,	the	economic	literature	on	externalities	only	burgeoned	







ideas	 from	 their	 original	 context	 to	 their	 invocation	by	 economists	 in	 the	 twenty-first	
century,	 Kumekawa’s	 book	 is	 an	 exemplar	 case	 of	 intellectual	 history.	 This	 book	 has	
been	years	 in	the	making.	 It	 is	very	well	 researched	and	the	result	 is	a	truly	enjoyable	
read.	Aslanbeigui	and	Oakes	(2018)	have	identified	small	factual	mistakes	which	I	think	
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